


WORKING PAPER 04

What are the Underlying Principles of our Education System?

Dr Henry Kippin and Prof Alison Wolf



2020 Public Services Trust
at the RSA

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Published by the 2020 Public Services Trust, September 2010.

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Working Paper 04

What are the Underlying Principles of our Education System?

Dr Henry Kippin, Professor Alison Wolf

This short paper asks: what are the underlying principles of England's education system? How do these principles and purposes impact upon the way education is distributed, delivered, experienced and accounted for? And why does this matter?

The World Bank is perfectly clear: "Education is central to development; it empowers people and strengthens nations. It is one of the most powerful instruments for reducing poverty and inequality and helps lay a foundation for sustained economic growth."¹ In the UK, the sector has sustained support for high levels of spending², and has been at the changing coalface of public service reform since Labour came to power in 1997. According to one recent study, 'total (global) public spending on education currently exceeds 3 trillion dollars each year and most developed countries have more than doubled their education spending over the past four decades'.³ Education is also the beneficiary of very large amounts of private expenditure, even in some of the world's poorest countries.⁴

This enormous increase in education spending by governments reflects the high value placed on education across multiple measures of human progress. For example, we can demonstrate tangible links between education and individual wealth – high educational achievement will often translate into higher earnings later in life. Many would argue that these benefits can also be articulated collectively, that greater spending on education (and its resultant benefits) can, at least under certain conditions, have a causally positive effect on national economic growth and competitiveness within international markets.

We also understand the benefits of education in broader social terms: in addition to raising the socioeconomic status of individuals through their lifecycle, we also know that education generally raises the individual's cognitive and social skill levels, with the collective benefit of an informed and knowledgeable citizenry. Education has also inevitably been seen as a mechanism for creating (shared) identity: modern publicly-funded systems are coterminous with and creations of the modern nation-state.

Articulated collectively, we might argue that education plays a uniquely positive role in 'socialisation, fostering social justice and enhancing social cohesion', all of which imply expenditure by society rather than the individual, and also considerable levels of intervention in the way it is provided, whether or not via direct provision.⁵ The argument can also be made - though this is more and increasingly contested - that the provision of education as a public service, rather than a privately purchased one, is necessary. This is to ensure that provision is fair and efficient: that all individuals, not just some, are able to develop their own human capital, and that enough gets spent on education (and spent in the right way) to ensure economic benefits of value to individuals and to society at large.

However, none of these arguments implies a clear and self-evident choice between:

- ring-fenced expenditures on education rather than cash subsidies (for example via tax credits)
- very high levels of subsidy (covering the full cost of 'quality' provision); partial subsidies; and/or limitations on levels of private contributions
- direct state provision; a 'mixed' economy'; or (regulated) independent/private provision
- common entitlements by age or citizenship, or entitlements which are contingent on personal characteristics (for example family circumstance or academic attainment)

It is highly unlikely that a society would ever reach total agreement on these issues. There will always be differences in the value people attach to (for example) shared school experiences and common socialisation, as compared to family autonomy and opportunities to experiment.⁶

Nonetheless, there is widespread consensus on important points, including the centrality of education to both the functioning of the economy and society,

and to individual opportunity and social mobility. So it is extraordinary how far our existing system – which spans early years, school age, further and higher education – betrays a mixture of purposes and aims, and is driven by an inconsistent set of underlying principles. We might ask:

- Why is school compulsory and free for all children, yet early years education is a non-compulsory mixed market, with different entitlements at different ages?⁷
- Why does the state demand co-payment for services at certain educational stages, and not at others?
- Why is profit-making allowed in the case of the (state-supported) education of a child aged 4, but not a child aged 5, 6 or 14 - and is allowed for some 18 year olds and not for others?
- Why are fees tightly controlled in some parts of post-compulsory education and not at all in others?
- Why economic objectives have become ever more important in the last two decades at the expense of all others- determining subsidy patterns and detailed requirements for provision - but very unequally, across the system.

Such questions are increasingly significant as we enter an era in which the breadth and scope of state spending will be harshly scrutinised, and in which the imperatives of cost-effectiveness and relative efficiency will magnify inconsistencies of purpose and outcome. As the following pages show, some inconsistencies reflect genuine differences between the nature of the 'good' in question and its social or economic function. In other cases, differences in purpose appear rather arbitrary or reflective of historical or political priorities. Even for services that share ostensibly similar social and economic objectives, these differences – in the way entitlements are allocated, delivered and accounted for – are evident.

The following pages offer only a snapshot of our education system. Yet they contextualise a vital point. Without seriously re-examining our current public services settlement - with all of its successes, failures and inconsistencies – we risk needing increasing amounts of funding simply to maintain current standards over the coming years. Instead, we should use this point in time to unpack our underlying values, demonstrate how funding patterns have been mapped onto these values, and throw this model open to radical reassessment. The following pages will provide some tools to start this process.

Thinking About Purpose

Education has remained such a high priority across the political spectrum due to its diversity of purposes – ranging from a driver of national economic growth, to a core ingredient of the social ‘glue’ that holds our diverse society together. Each stage of education in some way contributes to this array of positive benefits, but a closer look at these stages within the education cycle reveals a variety of underlying purposes. The following table sets these out - they are our interpretation of contemporary objectives, and some objectives that were important in the past have effectively vanished.

Table 1:

Education Stage	Underlying Purpose
Early Years	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic – promotion of parental employment in order to develop human capital of adults. 2. Equality of opportunity – within generations (gender equality) & between generations. 3. Child development.
School ^a	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Child Development & Learning (including, but not confined to, areas with immediate and high economic returns for individuals). 2. National Citizenship. 3. Selection into FE & HE. 4. Economic – general human capital development/promotion of areas with high social returns.
Further Education	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic (i) – Human Capital Development driven by specific and current business ‘needs’. 2. Economic (ii) - Second Chance – re-tooling to adapt to flexible/global economy/general human capital development.
Higher Education	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic (i) – human capital development with immediate and measurable private and social returns. 2. Economic (ii) Fostering of leading-edge research with likely economic implications in the future. 3. Adult development and advancement of learning.

The table shows that each stage of education has a distinct institutional identity and a different set of underlying purposes - a reflection of historical vested interest, and popular preconceptions about the intrinsic value and/or benefits of education at each stage. Yet despite this diversity, we can clearly see an explicit belief in the direct *economic* benefits of education cutting across the four stages above. It is worth analysing this further:

Early Years & School Age

The 'enormous' increase in public spending on the early years sector under New Labour⁹ reflected growing evidence as to the developmental benefits of early educational intervention¹⁰, and a focus on issues of child poverty and inequality. But it was also driven by two contemporary economic imperatives – the shifting balance of gender participation within the labour market and the growth of single parenthood, and the desire to facilitate and promote parental employment.¹¹ At school age, we can see a quite different set of purposes - much more attuned to the value of education for national citizenship, and to a sense of the collective, societal benefit from compulsory and free education. Looking at the relative balance between private and social returns from these stages, the perception is of a high private return from early years education, compared to a high social return from school age provision.

Further Education & Skills

For those children moving into further education, the underlying purpose for public subsidy of their learning is again shifted, this time towards developing their human capital to maximise potential utility within the UK labour market. FE policy is now designed to be an 'engine of growth' for business, with the more traditional aims of adult education downgraded. However, the problems of contemporary government skills policy¹² in many ways reflect the intrinsic tension between a highly centralised skills curriculum and a fast-changing liberal market economy.¹³ One recent review of policy over the last decade argued that despite significant resources being ploughed into the sector, 'evidence is mixed' as to the economic value of the qualifications earned by those completing FE courses.¹⁴ Current policies have drawn heavy criticism from across the political spectrum.¹⁵

Higher Education

At the higher education stage, we can see a clearer analysis of the links between evidence on the private returns for individuals and the implications for fee and pricing policies.¹⁶ Social returns from HE are evident, but are considerably harder to estimate¹⁷, allowing the government to subsidise education at a lower level and to affect the distribution of consumption at this stage (through the introduction of means-tested loans and fees). However, although methods for paying for higher education have been discussed with more sophistication and a much higher

public profile than in any other area, government policy is also driven by arbitrary participation targets. Recently, additional funding and places have been ring-fenced for 'employer-related' initiatives, in which there is direct employer involvement in the development of courses and course content.

Common to all of these examples is a sense that the links between education and national economic growth are still relatively poorly understood. As Wolf (2002) observes, 'throughout the developed world, politicians take it for a fact that education and economic growth are directly linked. They translate this into an enthusiasm for yet more education spending – and yet the balance of evidence is clearly against them'.¹⁸ In focusing so intensely on the value of the marginal pound spent on education to GDP, successive governments have underplayed the importance of other purposes of education across its stages. This focus has led to an education policy in the UK that is quite different from previous periods. And while other countries are also highly preoccupied with economic purposes, our system is distinctive in its overwhelming preoccupation with economic purposes to the virtual exclusion of all others.

This is particularly relevant within the current economic climate, in which young people leaving university are being forced to face a shrunken jobs market, breaking a well-ingrained cognitive link between getting a degree and immediately boosting one's earning potential. But if we are to promote social mobility through better and fairer access to education¹⁹, the extent to which private and social returns are real - or to which education is primarily an exercise with its own intrinsic value (for example learning or citizenship) - becomes a crucial one.

All of this matters greatly to the future funding and delivery of education. A coherent education policy should rest on a clear delineation of education's objectives. And if we do not clarify what the objectives are, and who are the beneficiaries of different outcomes, then we are likely to end up with an extremely muddled and inefficient funding regime.

How purpose affects the distribution, production and consumption of education

The purposes of education to which government gives priority - explicitly or otherwise - have profound and long-lasting effects on the way education services are aligned, distributed, produced and consumed. And inconsistency of purpose (whether justified or otherwise) also drives a varied and arguably mismatched set

of funding models. All of this matters greatly to the efficacy of the system, and the way we account for the outcomes the system generates.

Table 2 shows how the mechanism and distribution of public provision is aligned (or not!) to the underlying purpose of education through its stages. For example, the centrality of school-age education to citizenship can drive a free and compulsory system, with a diversity of providers, but tight government control over curricula. The state sets a universal minimum, allowing choice for parents within the state system, but no transfer of entitlements or top-up of contributions.

In early years, the picture looks rather different. The stated purpose of state intervention at this stage has been largely economic, and reflective of a contemporary set of social risks. Because of this (and the 'late arrival' of early years education as a public service) we can see greater use of market-based mechanisms, sharing the provision of early years care across the public, private and third sectors, and sharing the cost between individuals (families) and the state. Public entitlements are distributed as a mixture of services, vouchers and tax allowances, but in a way which reflects a variety of overlapping priorities. A series of papers from CentreForum is useful in explaining this.²⁰

Higher education is characterised by direct state provision,²¹ with contemporary entitlement contingent upon exam results (as has traditionally been the case), but also partially on income. As discussed above, this contemporary model broadly corresponds to an orthodox economic justification for cost-sharing between the individual and the state, given the high private return students will generally receive as a result of university education (but higher risk aversion and limited access to family resources among poorer students).

Across all four stages, the perceived ratio of social to private returns from education is a key driver of mechanism and distribution. Where private benefits are perceived to be high – for early years and higher education – we are likely to see more co-payment for services. This distribution does not always reflect the real balance of private versus public benefit however. We know that social returns from education are notoriously hard to measure. And in the case of 5-16 education, it is the immediate private return that is largely undervalued,²² except perhaps on inset days and school holidays when parents must make alternative childcare arrangements.

Table 2 also shows us how the distribution of education across its four stages maps onto the level of entitlement citizens receive. In general, we can argue that where access to services is universal, the level of service entitlement is likely to be

Table 2:

Stage	Purpose*	Mechanism	Distribution
Early Years	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic - promotion of parental employment in order to develop human capital of adults. 2. Equality of Opportunity – within generations (gender equality) & between generations. Child Development. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mix of services and tax credits/vouchers and tax allowances: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Free hours (vouchers). b. Cash transfers (tax credits). c. Tax allowance. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Age contingent, universal for 3-4 year olds (vouchers). 2. Work contingent, means tested. 3. Work contingent, employer contingent (non-targeted, non-means tested).
Schools	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Child Development & Learning (including, but not confined to, areas with immediate and high economic returns for individuals. 2. National Citizenship. 3. Selection into FE & HE. 4. Economic – general human capital development/promotion of areas with high social returns. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Direct control of service provision: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. State (comprehensive). b. State (selective). c. Religious schools. d. Academies. e. (Non-state funded provision in separate institutions only). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Universal, compulsory. 2. Minimum entitlement (non-transferable, fixed value). 3. Funding follows students (although institutions cannot expand).
Further Education	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic (i) - Human capital development driven by specific and current business needs. 2. Economic (ii) - Second Chance - re-tooling to adapt to flexible/global economy/general human capital development. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Direct state provision 2. Private-sector training providers (paid by government) <p>(Non-state funded provision can co-exist in theory in all of these but has largely vanished from public institutions)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partially exam results contingent (for certain levels of study). 2. Partially income contingent (for certain levels of study). 3. Complex entitlements 4. Employer demand prioritised. 5. Public funds distributed via contracts with providers rather than following students.
Higher Education	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic (i) – human capital development with immediate and measurable private and social returns. 2. Economic (ii) – fostering of leading edge research with likely economic implications in the future. 3. Adult development and advancement of learning. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Direct state provision (for some groups of students) in quasi-public institutions. <p>(Non-state-funded provision co-exists in the same institutions.)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Exam results contingent. 2. Partially income contingent. 3. Means tested bursaries. 4. Universal tuition fee (by course and institution) rate.

* Purpose = what is the stated or assumed purpose of education at this particular stage? Mechanism = what kind of provision does the state align to these purposes? Distribution = what is the basis of public entitlement to education at this stage? Quality Production = how do the mechanisms through which services are provided ensure quality? Effective Consumption = what incentives and/or limits are in place to ensure that people 'consume' the service at the right level (thus creating 'value')? Accountability = how is the stage of education rendered managerially, legally and politically accountable?

Value Creation: Quality Production	Value Creation: Effective Consumption	Accountability	Who Benefits?
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mixed market. 2. Public exemplars. 3. Profits allowed. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Parental choice: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> b. To consume at all. c. Choice of provider. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Quasi-market. 2. Inspection. 3. Market. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Children (but least goes to children on non-employed?) • Parents, especially as employees. • Employers of parents. • Owners/providers/workforce. • (Wider society).
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public provision. 2. No profits (e.g. Academies). 3. Quasi-market. 4. Specialisation. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Parental choice (search and matching among limited set of suppliers). 2. Forced consumption. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Quasi-market. 2. Inspection. 3. Governors. 4. Local Authorities. 5. Targets. 6. League tables. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pupils (whole cohort other than those in independent sector). • Parents (other than those using independent sector). • Employers of parents/future employers of pupils. • Workforce (state employees). • (Wider society).
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public provision. 2. No profits. 3. Specialisation. 4. Reputation. 5. Link to employers. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Choice to consumers: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Choice of subject. b. Choice of institution (restricted set). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Quasi-market (domestic). 2. Market (for fee-payers). 3. Inspection. 4. Regulation of courses offered and of course content and delivery methods. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employers. • Students/trainees (in cases where there are positive individual returns). • Workforce/owners of private companies and their employees. • (Wider society).
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public provision. 2. No profits. 3. Specialisation. 4. Reputation. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Choice to consumers: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Choice of subject. b. Choice of institution (restricted set). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Market (international + some home students). 2. Inspection. 3. Quasi-market (domestic): <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Competition for 'good' students – numbers fixed. b. Competition for research funds. 4. League tables. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Students (disproportionately those from more advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds). • Workforce. • Employers. • (Wider society).

higher. Conversely, where access to services is income contingent, we are more likely to see a reduced level of provision. Public early years education, for example, is universal only for 3-4 year olds, up to a certain hours allowance, and distributed through an employer/work-contingent vouchers system. At school age and through FE, a guarantee of universal access is met with a more comprehensive entitlement.

Following the money shows that the underlying assumptions driving the purpose and mechanism of public education are reflected in inconsistent funding models. In early years, we assume co-payment for education. In higher education, we demand it. Yet in school-age and further education, direct state provision is underpins a set of services that are universally provided²³ and free at the point of entry.²⁴ This reflects a well-entrenched set of national priorities, but also the incremental nature of the policy development process. The principle of co-payment for University study remains, for example, fiercely resisted by many. It was presented to the public as a solution to a funding crisis, rather than a policy shift based on ideology or principle; it was indeed a funding crisis that provided the political will for change. And in general, we can argue that it has been harder for politicians to enact radical changes to those stages of education in which the 'voice' of students and parents – i.e. schools and HE – is louder and more articulate.²⁵

What lessons can we learn, and why does this matter?

This canter through our education system offers only a snapshot of a complex and multi-dimensional sector of public services. Yet even from this cursory viewpoint, some tentative conclusions are possible. We have already shown how inconsistency of purpose fundamentally affects the way we 'do' education, and how this maps onto citizen entitlements, accountability mechanisms and the shape of the provider market across its stages. It remains to ask: what are the conclusions we can draw from this? What lessons does thinking about underlying purpose give us for the future? Here are a few:

- First, it matters which 'public' is consuming public education - Table 2 suggests that those stages of education where vested interest (i.e. parental voice) is louder and more articulate, change will be harder to enact. For example, the establishment of a means-tested co-payment framework for higher education was fiercely contested. This is in contrast to the near-incessant pace of change in the FE sector, where the socioeconomic background of students (and parents)

has tended to be less privileged, and where direct assistance with living costs has nonetheless been far less generous.²⁶

- Second, the balance between private and public returns from education seems key. Table 2 implies that the current system is economically orthodox in that where the *perception* of higher private returns is prevalent, we are more likely to see co-payment for services. This appears the case in early years and HE. In school-age education (where collective social return is more keenly understood, despite significant private return too), the idea of such cost sharing has never been on the table, and the system remains bifurcated between public and private sector.
- Third, information asymmetries are key. Related to the above, state provision of education will always in part be a means to address the difficulty of citizens themselves defining good outcomes from - and quality production of - education. This is an information gap that we assume gets smaller as we get older. For instance, we believe it is reasonable that adults can and should make their own judgements. But we want to protect 5 year olds (who cannot choose for themselves) from the mischance of having uninformed or neglectful parents.
- Fourth, access and entitlement are usually linked. Table 2 shows that where access to services is universally provided (i.e. in schools), we are more likely to see a higher level of citizen entitlement. In contrast to schools, early years education - which is partially work and age contingent - is provided as a mix of maximum free entitlement and means-tested vouchers.

Finally - it is pretty clear that, from a inchoate and contested set of underlying principles will emerge a similarly jumbled-up set of policies - each stage making progress in itself, but on its own terms, and with integration and coherence made extremely different. There is a strong case to even reverse some of these policy tenets (and in most instances a strong counter-case too), but this will depend on a commitment to principle, and a long-term approach to reform.

A new coalition government must now maintain a nascent consensus across a broad swathe of policy areas. A glance at the coalition agreement reveals some concrete, controversial and potentially radical commitments - such as allowing new providers into the state school system ('free schools'), and establishing a pupil premium that would follow disadvantaged pupils. The document pledges to ensure 'robust standards and the highest quality teaching' even within the shadow of big public spending cuts.

Whatever the outcome of these negotiations, they should begin with a sound understanding of the principles underpinning our current settlement. Policy never starts with a clean slate, but we should at least ensure that whatever incremental reforms are enacted are the product of systematic thinking with a clear set of strategic end-goals in sight. The Commission on 2020 Public Services has proposed three policy shifts as a framework for this process: shifts in culture, in power and in finance. These provide a strategic backdrop for a diverse range of policies, and offer a means to quantify progress against broad and long-term social goals. A forthcoming research project – being carried out jointly between the 2020 Public Services Trust and the RSA - will ask how these shifts would impact on current education theory and practice, and what the journey from here to there might look like.

- 1 See Education and the World Bank –overview at [http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20040939~menuPK:282393~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20040939~menuPK:282393~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html) It is worth noting that the Bank has also published material questioning the ‘silver bullet’ link between education and economic growth. See for example Hanusheck, E.A. & Wobmann, L. (2007) ‘The Role of Education Quality in Economic Growth’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4122, February 2007
- 2 According to the most recent Ipsos MORI Public Spending Index, the NHS and ‘schools’ were the two areas most of the public believed should be protected from spending cuts. See Ipsos MORI Public Spending Index, 22 June 2009 at <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/poll-public-spending-charts-june-2009.pdf>
- 3 Whelan, F. (2009) *Lessons Learned: how good policies produce better schools* London: Fenton Whelan p.17
- 4 Private expenditures are difficult to estimate, although OECD governments attempt to do so for the annual ‘Education at a Glance’ publication (Paris: OECD). For a controversial take on private expenditure in poor countries see Tooley, J. & Dixon, P. (2005) ‘Private Education is Good for the Poor: a study of private schools serving the poor in low-income countries’ Washington DC: Cato Institute
- 5 West, A. (2008) ‘Education in Schools’ in Alcock, P; May, M. & Rowlingson, K. (2008) (eds) *The Students Companion to Social Policy* London, Blackwell Publishing p.326
- 6 Communist countries outlawed any form of private schooling. No liberal democracy does so but there are large variations in the extent to which there is tight control of private schools’ curricula, or acceptance of home schooling.
- 7 Paul Collier recently called this contrast ‘stark and irrational’. See ‘Private v State: here’s how to bridge the educational divide’ in *The Independent*, 14th January 2010. Accessible online at <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/paul-collier-private-v-state-heres-how-to-bridge-the-educational-divide-1867073.html>
- 8 plus Vllth form colleges & Vllth form in FE
- 9 Wolf, A. (2009) ‘Education’ in Uberoi, V. et al (2009) *Options for a New Britain* London: Palgrave Macmillan (113-138) p.121
- 10 See for example Astle, J. (2007) ‘The Surest Route: early years education and life chances’ London, CentreForum; DfES (2004) ‘The Effective Provision of Pre-School Education (EPPE) Project: final report’ London, DfES available at <http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/everychildmatters/publications/0/1160/>; NEF & Action for Children (2010) ‘Backing the Future: why investing in children is good for us all’ London, New Economics Foundation
- 11 Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) (ed) *New Risks, New Welfare: the transformation of the European welfare state* Oxford: Oxford University Press
- 12 Wolf, A. (2007) ‘Round and Round the Houses: the Leitch Review of Skills’ *Local Economy* 22(2): 111-117; Keep, E., Mayhew, K. & Payne, J. (2006) ‘From skills revolution to productivity miracle—not as easy as it sounds’ *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 22(4), 539-559.
- 13 See for example Culpepper, P.D. (2007) ‘Small States and Skill Specificity: Austria, Switzerland, and Interemployer Cleavages in Coordinated Capitalism’ *Comparative Political Studies* 40(6)11-637)
- 14 Hills, J; Sefton, T. & Stewart, K. (2009) (eds) *Towards a More Equal Society? Poverty Inequality and Policy Since 1997* Bristol, Policy Press p84
- 15 From thinktanks ippr and Reform, for example.
- 16 Greenaway, D. & Haynes, M. (2003) ‘Funding Higher Education in the UK: the role of fees and loans’ *The Economic Journal* 113: 150-166 p.157
- 17 Wolf, A. (2002) *Does Education Matter? Myths about education and economic growth* London: Penguin Books P.27-8
- 18 Wolf, A. (2002) *Does Education Matter?* p.53
- 19 Only 21.9% of all young people entering higher education were from less advantaged socioeconomic groups in 2006/7 Cabinet Office (2009) ‘Unleashing Aspiration: the final report of the panel on fair access to the professions’ Ch.6
- 20 See CentreForum publications at <http://www.centreforum.org/publications/publications.html>

- 21 Although the University of Buckingham is one exception.
- 22 Certainly relative to childcare for children aged 0-4
- 23 Though some FE courses are contingent upon GCSE results
- 24 We might reflect on a stark choice for parents of school age children: pay for none of their education, or pay for all of it.
- 25 More generally, this evokes the problems with a consumer model for education which might see parent as 'customer', over protecting the rights of the child, or the collective societal value of compulsory education.
- 26 See Wolf, A. (2009) 'An Adult Approach to Further Education' London, Institute of Economic Affairs p.129

